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Preface
The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) regularly reviews the methods it uses to develop 
its economic and budget projections. Among the more important assumptions that underlie 
CBO’s economic forecast is the projection for the growth of labor productivity. It is widely 
recognized that labor productivity accelerated during the mid-1990s and that the increase in 
growth has largely continued until the present. This paper, prepared at the request of the 
Chairman and the Ranking Member of the Senate Budget Committee, documents that pro-
ductivity acceleration, highlighting some less-well-known aspects of the upswing in growth, 
including the effect that data revisions have had on CBO’s view of the trend in productivity 
growth and the shift in the source of the growth in labor productivity from increases in capital 
per worker toward total factor productivity. 
The paper also explores the reasons for the productivity acceleration and concludes that it 
likely stemmed from developments in the information technology (IT) sector, including faster 
technological change in the production of IT goods and the boom in business investment in 
those goods. Although widely accepted, that explanation raises two questions: Why did pro-
ductivity growth accelerate further during a period—the years since the 2001 business-cycle 
peak—when IT investment fell substantially? And why did European economies fail to expe-
rience a similar productivity surge even though they had access to the same IT goods that 
were available in the United States? The paper outlines several possible answers to those ques-
tions but concludes that further research will be necessary before economists can provide a 
consensus answer.
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Labor Productivity: Developments Since 1995
One striking aspect of recent U.S. economic his-
tory has been the vigorous growth in labor productivity. 
Between 1995 and 2006, the nation’s labor productivity, 
or output per hour worked, grew at an average annual 
rate of 2.7 percent, well above its 1947–1995 average of 
2.1 percent. The acceleration occurred despite several 
shocks that buffeted the economy during the period—a 
recession, two wars, terrorists’ attacks, corporate gover-
nance scandals, and a sharp increase in the price of oil.1 
More recently, productivity growth slowed, which has 
raised concerns that the trend rate of growth has shifted 
again. Since 2003, labor productivity growth has aver-
aged 1.8 percent annually, and in the final two quarters of 
2006 it averaged 0.5 percent at an annual rate. This 
recent slowdown underscores the variability in productiv-
ity growth and highlights the need for a long-term per-
spective when estimating trends in productivity. It also 
highlights the need to identify the sources of changes in 
productivity growth to determine whether they are likely 
to persist.
Productivity growth is the fundamental source of long-
term improvement in standards of living. When workers 
are able to produce more output per hour of work, eco-
nomic theory predicts that they will receive more pay, on 
average; and indeed, this is what the data show. Growth 
in aggregate real (inflation-adjusted) labor compensation 
generally has matched changes in overall productivity 
growth in the United States since World War II. The 
relationship, however, is not tight—the two measures can 
diverge for spans of several years—and the gains from 
productivity growth do not appear to be shared equally: 
Gains for the typical worker (and for lower-compensated 
workers) have trailed behind the average increase since 
the late 1990s while gains for highly compensated work-
ers have exceeded the average.2
The trend in productivity growth also plays an important 
role in the budget outlook published by the Congres-
sional Budget Office (CBO), because productivity 
growth is a key determinant of potential gross domestic 
product (GDP). The estimate and projection of potential 
GDP—the level of gross domestic product that corre-
sponds to a high rate of resource use—drives CBO’s pro-
jections of actual GDP and of tax bases for the 10 years 
ahead. For example, CBO estimates that each increase of 
0.1 percentage point in the average growth rate of labor 
productivity would, if sustained for 10 years, raise the 
level of GDP in 2017 by roughly 1 percent, or by about 
$200 billion. A higher level of GDP, in turn, would mean 
that the government could collect more in taxes and 
spend less on interest on the debt. All told, each increase 
of 0.1 percentage point would be expected to cut the def-
icit by an amount that also would rise each year, climbing 
to an annual reduction of roughly $60 billion by 2017. 
This paper describes the behavior of labor productivity 
since 1995, highlighting several aspects of productivity 
growth that perhaps have not been widely recognized and 
examining some possible explanations for the accelera-
tion. Analysts have concluded that the productivity1. Labor productivity is average real (inflation-adjusted) output per 
hour of labor; it is defined for the nonfarm business sector (the 
overall economy, excluding government, farms, residential hous-
ing, nonprofit institutions, and private households). Labor pro-
ductivity differs from total factor productivity (TFP), a concept 
discussed later in this paper, in that increases in capital per worker 
increase labor productivity but not TFP.
2. See Ian Dew-Becker and Robert Gordon, Where Did the Pro-
ductivity Growth Go? Inflation Dynamics and the Distribution of 
Income, Working Paper 11842 (Cambridge, Mass.: Bureau of 
Economic Research, December 2005).
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Figure 1.
Labor Productivity and Trend Growth, 
1950 to 2006
(Index)
Sources: Congressional Budget Office; Department of Labor, Bureau 
of Labor Statistics.
Note: Index (1996 = 1.0); data expressed in logarithmic form.
acceleration likely stemmed from developments in the 
information technology (IT) sector, including rapid tech-
nological change in the industries that produce IT goods. 
Labor Productivity Growth Since 1995
After more than 20 years of slow growth, labor productiv-
ity accelerated sharply during the second half of the 
1990s. It then sped up again after 2001, although it has 
slowed somewhat during the past three years. Nonethe-
less, the post-1995 acceleration was substantial: The 
growth trend in labor productivity stepped up to nearly 
3 percent, on average, between 1995 and 2006, a rate 
considerably faster than the 1.4 percent pace from 1974 
to 1995 (see Figure 1).3 Had it followed that pre-1996 
trend of 1.4 percent instead of the actual 2.9 percent, 
labor productivity would be 16 percent lower than it is 
today. Furthermore, if the 3 percent trend is sustained 
over the next decade, the level of real GDP will be nearly 
40 percent higher in 2017 than the level that would have 
resulted from the pre-1996 rate of growth. 
In the mid-1990s, few forecasters projected a dramatic 
increase in the trend rate of productivity growth; most 
anticipated a continuation of the modest growth of the 
two decades before. For example, in January 1995, CBO 
projected an average annual labor productivity growth 
rate of 1.3 percent for 1995 to 2000.4 Similarly, in its 
five-year projection published in February 1995, the 
Clinton Administration projected a rate of 1.25 percent.5 
And both projections for real GDP were similar to the 
GDP estimated by the consensus of private forecasters 
surveyed for the March 1995 edition of Blue Chip Eco-
nomic Indicators. That concordance suggests that the 
CBO and Administration projections for labor produc-
tivity also were consistent with the Blue Chip consensus.6
The upswing in productivity growth in the second half of 
the 1990s went unrecognized until very late in the 
decade, in part because of the volatile nature of the data 
series. Labor productivity growth can swing widely from 
quarter to quarter, and two or three years is a short period 
within which to discern a new trend. Moreover, the accel-
eration followed on the heels of a period of subpar growth 
(productivity growth averaged only 0.22 percent annually 
between the end of 1992 and the third quarter of 1995) 
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3. The increase in the productivity growth trend since 1995 illus-
trated in Figure 1 consists of several changes in productivity 
growth over shorter periods. Between late 1995 and the business-
cycle peak in the first quarter of 2001, for example, labor produc-
tivity growth averaged 2.5 percent annually. Between the first 
quarter of 2001 and the third quarter of 2003, labor productivity 
surged at an average annual rate of 4.5 percent before falling back 
to a 1.6 percent rate of growth between the end of 2003 and the 
end of 2006. Productivity growth averaged 2.8 percent annually 
between the peak in 2001 and the end of 2006.
4. See Congressional Budget Office, The Economic and Budget Out-
look: Fiscal Years 1996–2000 (January 1995).
5. See Economic Report of the President (February 1995), p. 125. 
6. One notable exception was Federal Reserve Board Chairman Alan 
Greenspan, who, as early as 1992, raised the possibility of faster 
trend growth in labor productivity, based in part on anecdotal 
evidence from industry sources. Nevertheless, Federal Reserve staff 
forecasts of trend productivity growth during that period were 
similar to the consensus of private-sector and government fore-
casts. For more details, see Richard G. Anderson and Kevin L. 
Kliesen, Productivity Measurement and Monetary Policymaking 
During the 1990s, Working Paper 2005-067A (Federal Reserve 
Bank of St. Louis, October 2005). 
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Table 1.
Changes in Estimates of the Average Annual Growth Rate for Labor Productivity
(Percent)
Source: Congressional Budget Office based on data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics and the Bureau of Economic Analysis.
a. CBO’s annual January forecast is based on a Bureau of Labor Statistics data set that extends through the third quarter of the previous year.
so, initially, the faster growth looked as if it were just 
making up lost ground rather than establishing a new, 
higher trend growth rate. The history of the series 
includes several episodes of faster- or slower-than-trend 
growth that were later reversed.7 
Inaccuracies in early vintages of the underlying data are 
the other reason the productivity acceleration went 
unrecognized during its early stages. Data that were avail-
able to analysts in 1996, 1997, and 1998 showed only a 
small rise in the rate of labor productivity growth. After 
several revisions, however, and with data from a longer 
period, a stronger pattern emerged. Data published by 
the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) during the late1990s 
(see Table 1) illustrate the pattern. At first, there was no 
apparent acceleration. Data available in early 1997 
showed labor productivity growing by a mere 0.3 percent 
from the fourth quarter of 1995 through the third quar-
ter of 1996. Currently available data tell a different story: 
Labor productivity growth for the period was actually a 
robust 3.1 percent. 
A similar case holds for 1998 and 1999. Data that were 
available in January 1998 showed labor productivity 
growth averaging 1.8 percent between the fourth quarter 
of 1995 and the third quarter of 1997. That rate has since 
been revised to 2.5 percent. The growth rate for the 
three-year period ending in the third quarter of 1998 also 
has been revised from 2.0 percent (using data from early 
1999) to 2.6 percent (using currently available data).
The information in Table 1 highlights an important 
point: Productivity data are revised frequently, and the 
revisions can be large enough to alter analyses of trends in 
productivity growth.8 Indeed, after being revised upward 
several times during the late 1990s, productivity data 
have been revised downward somewhat during recent 
years. In January 2000, labor productivity growth for 
1996 to 1999 was estimated at 2.7 percent; that estimate 
has since been revised to 2.5 percent. The estimate of 
growth in total factor productivity (TFP), or output per 
unit of labor and capital combined, was revised down-
ward by a slightly larger amount. Using current data, 
CBO estimates that TFP grew at an average annual rate 
of 1.3 percent between 1995 and 1999. In contrast, data 
available in late 1999 showed a 1.7 percent average 
annual rate of TFP growth for the period.9
Period, Beginning
CBO Forecasta Last Quarter 1995
January 1997 To 3rd Quarter 1996 0.3 3.1 2.8
January 1998 To 3rd Quarter 1997 1.8 2.5 0.7
January 1999 To 3rd Quarter 1998 2.0 2.6 0.6
January 2000 To 3rd Quarter 1999 2.7 2.5 -0.2
Using Current Data
Revision
(Percentage points)
Average Annual Rate of Growth
Initial Estimate Current Estimate
Using Original Data
7. Slower productivity growth during the past three years has raised 
concerns about the possibility of another shift in the trend, but it 
is too soon to conclude that such a shift has taken place.
8. Productivity is computed using GDP data (from the national 
income and product accounts tabulated by the Bureau of Eco-
nomic Analysis) and employment data (largely from the Bureau of 
Labor Statistics payroll survey) so estimates will be affected by 
revisions to either data source. For more on those revisions, see 
Richard Anderson and Kevin Kliesen, “The 1990s Acceleration in 
Labor Productivity: Causes and Measurement,” Federal Reserve 
Bank of St. Louis Review, vol. 88, no. 3 (2006), pp. 181–202. 
Anderson and Kliesen note that early data supported only a lim-
ited role for service-producing industries in the late-1990s pro-
ductivity acceleration and that improved source data have since 
revealed that growth in productivity in the service sector increased 
by more than had been estimated originally.
9. For more details on the revisions to the data underlying TFP, see 
Congressional Budget Office, The Budget and Economic Outlook: 
Fiscal Years 2006 to 2015 (January 2005), Box 2-1, p. 29.
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Figure 2.
Growth in Labor Productivity, 
1950 to 2006
(Percentage change from previous year)
Sources: Congressional Budget Office; Department of Labor, Bureau 
of Labor Statistics.
More recently, revisions have changed the view of pro-
ductivity growth in 2005 and 2006. In early 2007, BLS 
released revised productivity data that showed labor pro-
ductivity growth averaged 1.5 percent annually between 
the beginning of 2005 and the third quarter of 2006. 
That rate was about 0.5 percentage points lower than 
BLS’s previous estimate of 2.0 percent. The revisions to 
the productivity data highlight the difficulty in recogniz-
ing a change in the underlying trend growth rate, war-
ranting additional caution in reaching conclusions about 
changes in that trend based on only a few quarters’ worth 
of information.
New Cyclical Pattern
Current data show that the productivity acceleration has 
been durable, proceeding without pause through the 
2001 recession, although it has moderated somewhat 
since 2003. Quarterly growth in labor productivity is vol-
atile, but a pattern is discernible from past business 
cycles. Typically, labor productivity declines during a 
recession but grows robustly during recovery and in the 
early stages of an expansion (see Figure 2). Although 
harder to detect, there may also be an “end-of-expansion” 
effect in operation, when productivity growth is relatively 
low near the end of a business-cycle expansion.10 
Since 1995, however, labor productivity has departed 
from that pattern. Growth in labor productivity surged 
during the early phase of the recovery from the 1990 
recession and then briefly fell back toward its previous 
trend before steadily accelerating in the late 1990s, just 
when past patterns would have suggested a period of 
below-trend growth. Although it was not evident at the 
time, that acceleration during the second half of the 
1990s coincided with the latter stages of a business-cycle 
expansion. Productivity growth has remained relatively 
strong since 2000, averaging 2.7 percent despite the 2001 
recession, the attacks of September 11, 2001, the wars in 
Iraq and Afghanistan, a series of corporate governance 
scandals, and a spike in oil prices—each of which had the 
potential to restrain the growth of output and productiv-
ity. Although productivity growth has slowed somewhat 
since 2003, the volatile nature of the growth rate and the 
possibility of further revisions mean that it is too soon to 
conclude that the growth trend has slowed or that the 
economy is approaching the end of the current business-
cycle expansion.
Shifting Sources of Growth
The sources of growth in productivity also have changed 
over the past decade. Analysts divide labor productivity 
growth into two components: capital deepening 
(increases in the amount of capital available per worker) 
and total factor productivity.11 Capital per worker rises 
not only because investment provides more factories, 
equipment, and software but because the quality of 
200519951985197519651955
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10. See Robert Gordon, Five Puzzles in the Behavior of Productivity, 
Investment, and Innovation, Working Paper 10660 (Cambridge, 
Mass.: National Bureau of Economic Research, August 2004). 
11. Tracing the sources of economic growth in this manner is termed 
growth accounting. An explanation is beyond the scope of this 
paper, but there is an excellent discussion of growth accounting in 
Bureau of Labor Statistics, Trends in Multifactor Productivity, 
1948–81, Bulletin 2178 (September 1983). CBO’s estimate of 
total factor productivity is similar to the bureau’s estimate of 
multifactor productivity (MFP). The two data series are calculated 
by the same method, but CBO uses slightly different source data, 
which allow it to estimate TFP for years too recent for MFP data 
to have become available.
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Table 2.
Contributions of Capital Deepening and Total Factor Productivity to Labor 
Productivity Growth, 1990 to 2005
Source: Congressional Budget Office based on data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics and the Bureau of Economic Analysis.
capital goods improves over time. For example, the com-
puter sitting on a typical office worker’s desk today has a 
vastly faster processor and far more disk storage than did 
an equivalent machine a decade ago. 
Although growth in TFP often is interpreted as a measure 
of technological change, it is an imperfect measure. TFP 
is computed by subtracting the growth contributions of 
labor and capital from the growth in output, so it reflects 
anything that causes output to grow faster than the com-
bined inputs. Analysts have attributed growth in TFP to 
such factors as economies of scale, measurement error, the 
educational attainment of the labor force, the regulatory 
environment, managerial ability, and innovation. The 
calculation is imprecise, but an examination of the trends 
in TFP and capital deepening reveals that the primary 
source of growth in labor productivity has shifted during 
the past 10 years.
CBO estimates that capital deepening was the primary 
source of the surge in labor productivity growth in the 
late 1990s and that faster TFP growth was the primary 
source during the period after the business-cycle peak in 
2001. Between the first and second halves of the 1990s, 
labor productivity growth stepped up from about 1.5 per-
cent, on average, to 2.5 percent per year. Growth in capi-
tal per worker accounted for 80 percent (0.8 percentage 
points) of that 1-percentage-point increase, CBO esti-
mates (see Table 2). Faster TFP growth was responsible 
for the rest of the step-up in productivity growth. Those 
conclusions are based on the data as currently published, 
so it is possible that future revisions will change the 
assessment of the period.
Since 2001, the sources of growth in labor productivity 
have reversed. Business investment fell substantially in 
2001 and 2002 and remained weak in 2003, thus slowing 
the growth in capital deepening relative to that in the late 
1990s. The contribution of capital per worker to labor 
productivity growth fell by 0.6 percentage points between 
2001 and 2005 relative to the 1996–2001 period. At the 
same time, however, TFP growth was accelerating 
sharply, especially in 2003 (see Figure 3). CBO estimates 
that TFP was responsible for all of the acceleration in 
labor productivity in the 2001–2005 period.12
It is important to ask whether labor productivity will con-
tinue to grow as rapidly over the next 10 years as it has 
during the past decade. But experience since 1995 illus-
trates why that question is so hard to answer. Labor pro-
ductivity growth is volatile, its measurement is subject to 
large revisions, and the reasons for changes in its rate of 
growth are not well understood. Consequently, it is a 
Contribution of Capital Deepening
(Percentage points) 0.50 1.33 0.76 0.83 -0.57
Contribution of Total Factor Productivity 
(Percentage points) 1.04 1.22 2.45 0.18 1.23____ ____ ____ ____ ____
Labor Productivity (Percent) 1.54 2.54 3.21 1.01 0.66
Average Annual Growth Rate
Change
1991–1995 to
1996–2001
1996–2001 to
2002–20051991–1995 1996–2001 2002–2005
12. Estimates of TFP (calculated at an annual frequency) are available 
through 2005. Estimates by CBO indicate that TFP growth, like 
labor productivity growth, slowed in 2006. The conclusions about 
the shifting sources of growth in labor productivity are based on 
the growth model used to calculate CBO’s medium-term pro-
jections. However, they are consistent with results published by 
other researchers. See, for example, Dale Jorgenson, Mun Ho, and 
Kevin Stiroh, “The Sources of the Second Surge of U.S. Produc-
tivity and Implications for the Future” (working paper, Harvard 
University, March 2006); Carol Corrado and others, “Modeling 
Aggregate Productivity at a Disaggregate Level: New Results for 
U.S. Sectors and Industries” (working paper, Federal Reserve 
Board, July 2006); and Mark Lasky, Putty-Clay Capital and 
an Index of Capital per Hour, CBO Working Paper 2005-08 
(June 2005). 
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Figure 3.
Total Factor Productivity and
Trend Growth, 1980 to 2006
(Index)
Sources: Congressional Budget Office; Department of Labor, Bureau 
of Labor Statistics.
Note: Index (1996 = 1.0); data expressed in logarithmic form.
difficult variable to forecast; past patterns and recent data 
provide only a rough guide to where labor productivity 
will go in the future. Explanations for the recent accel-
eration help to determine whether any of the changes 
to growth since 1995 will reverse or recur in the next 
10 years.
Explaining the Post-1995
Productivity Acceleration
Although it is hard to say conclusively that one factor is 
the sole cause of the acceleration in productivity growth 
that began in 1995, there is a consensus among econo-
mists that investment in information technology is a 
primary source. Evidence comes from studies that have 
analyzed aggregate (economywide), industry-level, and 
firm-level data.
Early evidence came from studies that used a growth-
accounting framework and aggregate data to calculate the 
contributions to economic growth made by the inputs to 
production—labor, capital, and TFP. Using that frame-
work, several analysts determined that developments in 
IT have influenced productivity growth both through 
capital deepening and through TFP growth.13 Increased 
investment in IT capital goods, spurred perhaps by falling 
prices, contributed to growth in labor productivity by 
increasing the amount of capital available to each worker 
(capital deepening). During the late 1990s, not only did 
business investment boom, but it was heavily tilted 
toward IT goods (see Figure 4). CBO’s estimates indicate 
that faster capital deepening accounted for about 80 per-
cent of the 1-percentage-point acceleration in labor pro-
ductivity during the late 1990s and that IT capital 
accounted for 75 percent of the contribution from capital 
deepening.
Rapid technological change in the IT industries (which 
include computers, software, and telecommunications) 
can speed TFP growth in those industries. And if those 
industries are large enough or the pace of technological 
change is fast enough, then faster TFP growth in that sec-
tor of the economy can accelerate TFP growth overall. 
Indeed, this is what appears to have happened in the late 
1990s. According to estimates by Steven Oliner and 
Daniel Sichel, for example, the computer and semi-
conductor industries accounted for about half of TFP 
growth from 1996 to 1999, even though the output 
of those industries contributed only about 2.5 percent of 
GDP in the nonfarm business sector during that 
period.14
The research illustrates that both the production and the 
use of IT goods in the United States contributed substan-
tially to the productivity acceleration in the late 1990s. 
The studies, however, have inherent limitations. In par-
ticular, growth-accounting exercises assume the values of 
key parameters rather than estimating them by statistical 
techniques. For example, the elasticity of output with 
respect to IT capital—which measures the effect on out-
put of an increase in the stock of IT capital—is an 
assumption that is based on the predictions of economic 
theory rather than on the results of an econometric 
regression equation. Setting the value of the elasticity
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13. See Steven Oliner and Daniel Sichel, “The Resurgence of Growth 
in the Late 1990s: Is Information Technology the Story?” Journal 
of Economic Perspectives, vol. 14, no. 4 (2000), pp. 3–22; and Dale 
Jorgenson and Kevin Stiroh, “Raising the Speed Limit: U.S. Eco-
nomic Growth in the Information Age,” Brookings Papers on Eco-
nomic Activity, vol. 1 (2000), pp. 125–211. 
14. See Oliner and Sichel, “The Resurgence of Growth in the Late 
1990s” (2000).
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Figure 4.
Investment in Producers’ Durable 
Equipment, 1960 to 2006
(Percentage of gross domestic product)
Sources: Congressional Budget Office; Department of Commerce, 
Bureau of Economic Analysis.
implies that investment spending is not wasted (on aver-
age) and that the productivity impact of, say, a newly 
acquired computer is immediate.15 That assumption 
could be an important source of error; there is evidence 
that the full effect of IT spending on productivity occurs 
after a considerable delay. Consequently, productivity 
growth in the late 1990s could have been the result of IT 
spending in the early 1990s or even in the late 1980s.
To be sure, economists would prefer to estimate the effect 
of IT spending on productivity growth rather than 
impose it by assumption, but there are considerable sta-
tistical problems associated with estimating the relevant 
parameters, at least using economywide data. The appli-
cation of growth-accounting methods, however, is a 
reasonable approach that sidesteps those statistical chal-
lenges. Nevertheless, growth-accounting studies identify 
only the proximate sources of growth and not the factors 
that drive investment or technological progress.
Despite the important limitations, the fundamental con-
clusion of growth-accounting studies—that IT was the 
primary source of the acceleration—is still valid. Other 
studies that used industry- and firm-level data support 
the growth-accounting results and provide further infor-
mation about the effects of IT spending. In a 2002 paper, 
for example, Kevin Stiroh reported that the post-1995 
revival in labor productivity was widespread, that it 
reflected gains in a majority of industries, and that it was 
linked to IT spending.16 Moreover, IT-intensive indus-
tries realized larger productivity accelerations than other 
industries did. Other researchers have reported that the 
productivity acceleration was concentrated in service-
producing industries.17
Perhaps the strongest evidence of a link between IT and 
productivity comes from studies that use firm- or plant-
level data. That research typically uses regression equa-
tions to estimate the elasticity of output with respect to 
IT capital, and it generally reports a positive and signifi-
cant relationship between IT spending and productiv-
ity.18 Indeed, some estimates from studies that use micro-
economic data suggest that the productivity payoff from 
IT investment could be quite large, perhaps twice what 
would be predicted by economic theory. That is a tenta-
tive conclusion, however, and there is considerable varia-
tion among studies in the estimates of the elasticity asso-
ciated with IT spending.19 
15. See Robert Gordon, “Exploding Productivity Growth: Context, 
Causes, and Implications,” Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 
vol. 2 (2003), pp. 207–279.
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16. See Kevin Stiroh, “Information Technology and the U.S. Produc-
tivity Revival: What Do the Industry Data Say?” American Eco-
nomic Review, vol. 92, no. 5 (2002), pp. 1559–1576. In another 
paper, Stiroh presents evidence that the primary effect of IT 
spending is capital deepening and that such spending does not 
speed TFP growth. See Kevin Stiroh, “Are ICT Spillovers Driving 
the New Economy?” Review of Income and Wealth, vol. 48, no. 1 
(2002), pp. 33–57. Similar findings were presented by Martin 
Baily and Robert Lawrence, “Do We Have a New E-conomy?” 
American Economic Review, vol. 91, no. 2 (2001), pp. 308–312.
17. See Anderson and Kliesen, “The 1990s Acceleration in Labor Pro-
ductivity.” Among service industries, it appears that TFP was the 
primary source of the acceleration in labor productivity during the 
late 1990s. See Jack Triplett and Barry Bosworth, “Productivity 
Measurement Issues in Services Industries: ‘Baumol’s Disease’ Has 
Been Cured,” Economic Policy Review, Federal Reserve Bank of 
New York (September 2003), pp. 23–33; and Barry Bosworth and 
Jack Triplett, “Is the 21st Century Productivity Expansion Still in 
Services? And What Should Be Done About It?” (paper prepared 
for the National Bureau of Economic Research Conference on 
Research in Income and Wealth, Cambridge, Mass., July 16, 
2006).
8 LABOR PRODUCTIVITY: DEVELOPMENTS SINCE 1995
Analysts generally agree that IT investment is the primary 
source of the revival in labor productivity, but research on 
the causes of the acceleration has revealed two conun-
drums about the connection between IT investment and 
productivity. First, although spending on IT capital col-
lapsed after 2000, a second surge in productivity began 
about the same time. And second, although IT technol-
ogy is accessible to businesses anywhere in the world, the 
productivity acceleration was limited largely to the 
United States. Although European economies in particu-
lar invested heavily in IT, they have not shared in the pro-
ductivity gains.
Explaining the Post-2001
Productivity Acceleration
The sources of the surge in productivity growth after 
2001 are murkier. Less time has elapsed, so analysts have 
a smaller data set for evaluation, and thus it is more diffi-
cult to identify a new trend. Moreover, the data for the 
period already have been revised substantially and 
undoubtedly will be revised again in the coming years, to 
further cloud the picture.
The second productivity acceleration occurred during a 
period when business investment collapsed, which 
strongly suggests that capital deepening was not the pri-
mary source of the surge. Indeed, the post-2001 accelera-
tion can be explained entirely by faster TFP growth, with 
no contribution from capital deepening. Moreover, ana-
lysts have reported a shift in the set of industries responsi-
ble for the second surge in productivity. Whereas the 
post-1995 surge can be traced to the industries that were 
the most intensive users of IT capital (along with those 
that produced IT capital), the post-2001 acceleration has 
been more broadly based, and strong gains have been 
registered by industries that use IT less intensively.20
Despite that, the second surge could still be the result of 
IT spending if there is a lag between the time when the 
IT capital is installed and the time when businesses 
achieve productivity gains. If so, the surge could be a 
delayed response to the late-1990s investment boom. 
Studies that use firm-level data have identified a strong 
relationship between IT spending and productivity 
growth, and there is evidence of long delays—five to 
seven years, in some cases—between IT spending and 
productivity payoff. 
Several theories, not necessarily mutually exclusive, have 
been proposed to explain the delay. One focuses on the 
adjustment costs associated with large changes in the size 
of the capital stock. 21 According to that theory, busi-
nesses had difficulty absorbing all of the IT goods 
acquired during the investment boom of the late 1990s 
and were forced to divert resources from production in 
order to integrate new equipment and technology into 
their productive processes. If that is the case, then adjust-
ment costs suppressed productivity growth in the late 
1990s but boosted it after 2001. The pause in capital 
spending since 2001 has allowed companies to catch up, 
and the recent hike in productivity is a delayed payoff for 
the investments of the 1990s. 
Another hypothesis holds that computers (and IT goods 
in general) are examples of general-purpose technology 
that allows businesses to fundamentally change the way 
they operate. Like dynamos and electric motors, which 
freed early-20th-century factory owners from the require-
ment to build next to a river, computers gave businesses a 
faster way to manage information and, therefore, a way to 
produce more efficiently. But it takes time for new tech-
nology to produce results: Business owners must learn to 
adjust processes to make the best use of the new technol-
ogy, and that transition can take years, or even decades.22
Still another idea, closely related to the first two, focuses 
on the link between IT spending and investment in 
“intangible capital”—investment spending that is 
18. See Erik Brynjolfsson and Lorin Hitt, “Computing Productivity: 
Firm-Level Evidence,” Review of Economics and Statistics, vol. 85, 
no. 4 (2003), pp. 793–808; Brynjolfsson and Hitt, “Paradox Lost? 
Firm-Level Evidence on the Returns to Information Systems 
Spending,” Management Science, vol. 42, no. 4 (1996), pp. 541–
558; and Brynjolfsson and Hitt, “Information Technology as a 
Factor of Production: The Role of Differences Among Firms,” 
Economics of Innovation and New Technology, vol. 3, no. 4 (1995), 
pp. 183–200.
19. See Kevin Stiroh, “Reassessing the Impact of IT in the Production 
Function: A Meta-Analysis and Sensitivity Tests,” (working paper, 
Federal Reserve Bank of New York, November 2004).
20. See Kevin Stiroh, “The Industry Origins of the Second Surge of 
U.S. Productivity Growth” (working paper, Federal Reserve Bank 
of New York, February 2006); and Corrado and others, “Model-
ing Aggregate Productivity at a Disaggregate Level” (2006).
21. See Susanto Basu, John Fernald, and Matthew Shapiro, “Produc-
tivity Growth in the 1990s: Technology, Utilization, or Adjust-
ment?” Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy, vol. 
55 (2001), pp. 117–165.
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intended to increase future output more than current 
production and that does not result in ownership of a 
physical asset. When new technology is introduced, busi-
nesses must dedicate resources—time and effort—to 
training workers in its best use. That process is an invest-
ment that results in an intangible asset, a body of knowl-
edge or expertise. The introduction of personal comput-
ers provided immediate benefits to businesses as workers 
performed regular tasks more efficiently. But to make the 
best use of the new technology—to reap its full bene-
fits—employees had to be trained, and that training is an 
investment in an intangible asset. 
One insight of the research on intangible capital is that 
productivity growth can be understated in periods when 
IT investment is growing rapidly because businesses are 
likely to divert labor from current production in favor of 
training in the use of new IT capital. The official statistics 
treat most spending for intangible capital—formal train-
ing classes are an exception—as a current expense rather 
than as investment, so such spending is not included in 
GDP. An explanation for the pattern in productivity 
growth since 1995 is that TFP growth was suppressed in 
the late 1990s (although it continued to grow), when 
investment in IT capital was heaviest, and then was 
unleashed after 2001, when spending for intangibles to 
absorb IT capital had abated.
Another and perhaps more powerful insight from the 
research on intangible capital is that advances in informa-
tion technology allow businesses to exploit the benefits of 
their investments in another form of intangible capital, 
often called “organizational capital.” As computing power 
becomes cheaper and more pervasive, managers can 
invent new business processes, work practices, and orga-
nizational structures, which in turn allow companies to 
produce entirely new goods and services or to improve 
their existing products’ convenience, variety, or quality.23 
The gains in productivity made possible by organiza-
tional changes can dwarf the direct increases in produc-
tivity that arise from doing familiar tasks more efficiently.
Erik Brynjolfsson and Lorin Hitt provide case study 
examples of business transformations made possible by 
combining information technology with new work prac-
tices and other investments in organizational capital.24 
Some of their examples describe changes to production 
processes, as when factories install computer-controlled 
machine tools. Although the machines can duplicate the 
established production methods (presumably more effi-
ciently), Brynjolfsson and Hitt demonstrate that more 
substantial productivity gains accrue when old work 
methods are replaced with new organizational practices. 
Other examples show how IT investments enable compa-
nies to change their relationships with suppliers, as when 
IT investments allow a company to order supplies elec-
tronically and share inventory data with suppliers, thus 
streamlining the process of restocking inventory and 
likely cutting costs. Still other examples involve the way 
companies interact with consumers, as when a computer 
manufacturer allows its customers to configure their sys-
tems online before purchase.
The research on intangible capital reveals three reasons 
that growth-accounting calculations can misstate the true 
contributions of computers and other IT goods: First, it 
is difficult to measure changes in the quality of goods and 
services. This is especially true if the changes are intangi-
ble, involving improvements in convenience, timeliness, 
or variety, for example. Next, official statistics treat most 
spending for intangible capital as a current expense rather 
than as an investment. Consequently, most of that spend-
ing is excluded from estimates of GDP and the capital 
stock.25 Finally, standard calculations can miss the 
complementary inventions that IT makes possible. They 
can occur years (or even decades) after the initial expendi-
ture. Growth-accounting calculations usually assume that 
the investments produce immediate results.
There is only indirect evidence that the post-2001 pro-
ductivity acceleration is a delayed effect of the late-1990s 
IT boom. Some recent studies using industry-level data 
22. For more on the diffusion of technology, see Paul David, “The 
Dynamo and the Computer: An Historical Perspective on the 
Modern Productivity Paradox, American Economic Review, vol. 80, 
no. 2 (1990), pp. 355–361; or Rodolfo Manuelli and Ananth 
Seshadri, Frictionless Technology Diffusion: The Case of Tractors, 
Working Paper 9604 (Cambridge, Mass.: National Bureau of Eco-
nomic Research, April 2003). Another study concluded that there 
were substantial delays between IT investment and increased pro-
ductivity in the trucking industry: See Thomas Hubbard, “Infor-
mation, Decisions, and Productivity: On-Board Computers and 
Capacity Utilization in Trucking,” American Economic Review, vol. 
93, no. 4 (2003), pp. 1328–1353.
23. For more details, see Erik Brynjolfsson and Lorin Hitt, “Beyond 
Computation: Information Technology, Organizational Transfor-
mation and Business Performance,” Journal of Economic Perspec-
tives, vol. 14, no. 1 (2000), pp. 23–48.
24. Ibid.
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indicate a positive correlation between TFP growth in the 
late 1990s and IT investment several years earlier. A 2003 
paper by Susanto Basu and several coauthors, for exam-
ple, linked TFP growth during the late 1990s with the 
rate of IT investment in the 1980s and early 1990s.26 
More recently, Carol Corrado and her coauthors reported 
a similar relationship between IT investment in the late 
1990s and TFP growth after 2000.27 Not everyone 
agrees, however. Kevin Stiroh finds that the link between 
IT spending and TFP growth was weaker during the 
2000s than in the late 1990s.28
Studies that use firm-level data also support the idea that 
the post-2001 acceleration is related to IT spending dur-
ing the late 1990s. Several report that the full benefits of 
investments in computers do not emerge for several years. 
For example, one study that relied on the results of a sur-
vey of more than 500 large U.S. businesses showed that 
the short-run rate of return on investments in computers 
is consistent with a normal rate of return on other invest-
ments. 29 The same paper showed that the productivity 
contribution of computers over longer periods—say, five 
to seven years—can be as much as five times greater, a 
result attributed to the payoff from the large investments 
in intangible capital, such as organizational redesign and 
business process reengineering, that often accompany 
investments in IT capital.
Analysts also have discovered that financial markets place 
a high value on companies that have made substantial 
investments in computers and other IT goods.30 The idea 
is that businesses must invest in new processes and train-
ing to reap the full benefits of computerization. Presum-
ably, the companies that do so expect to increase future 
productivity and profits. If their spending on organiza-
tional capital represents the accumulation of intangible 
assets and if financial markets recognize the value of those 
assets, then the companies’ market value should reflect 
that. The high value placed on firms that have spent 
heavily on IT capital supports this interpretation, and 
there is evidence that U.S. industries with larger invest-
ments in IT undertake more substantial reorganizations, 
thus providing further support for the intangible-capital 
hypothesis.31
Despite that evidence, it is possible that the post-2001 
productivity surge was not a delayed response to the IT 
boom of the late 1990s. Rather, it could have a more 
general, macroeconomic, explanation: It could have 
evolved from increased competitive pressure attributable 
to globalization, for example, or deregulation, or busi-
nesses’ caution in hiring that stemmed from geopolitical 
uncertainty. 
Studies that closely examine individual businesses or 
industries suggest that competitive pressure is an impor-
tant driver of productivity growth. Jose Galdon-Sanchez 
and James Schmitz, for example, describe a strong rela-
tionship between an increase in competitive pressure 
among iron ore mines in the early 1980s and later growth 
in labor productivity.32 In countries where competition 
was light, mines showed little increase in productivity; in 
countries with more competitive pressure, productivity 
gains were dramatic, with 50 percent to 100 percent 
increases by the end of the decade. Case studies, Martin 
Baily notes, show that productivity gains have diverse and 
25. Estimates vary, but the size of the stock of intangibles could be 
quite large, perhaps 10 times the stock of physical IT assets. See 
Erik Brynjolfsson, Lorin Hitt, and Shinkyu Yang, “Intangible 
Assets: Computers and Organizational Capital,” Brookings Papers 
on Economic Activity, vol. 1 (2002), pp. 137–181. For another esti-
mate, see Carol Corrado, Charles Hulten, and Daniel Sichel, 
“Measuring Capital and Technology: An Expanded Framework,” 
in Carol Corrado, John Haltiwanger, and Daniel Sichel, eds., 
Measuring Capital in the New Economy (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 2005), pp. 11–41.
26. See Susanto Basu and others, “The Case of the Missing Productiv-
ity Growth, Or Does Information Technology Explain Why Pro-
ductivity Accelerated in the United States but Not in the United 
Kingdom?” in Mark Gertler and Kenneth Rogoff, eds., NBER 
Macroeconomics Annual 2003 (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 
2003), pp. 9–63.
27. See Corrado, Hulten, and Sichel, “Measuring Capital and 
Technology” (2005). 
28. See Stiroh, “The Industry Origins of the Second Surge of U.S. 
Productivity Growth.”
29. See Brynjolfsson and Hitt, “Computing Productivity.”
30. See, for example, Brynjolfsson and Hitt, “Beyond Computation,” 
and Brynjolfsson, Hitt, and Yang, “Intangible Assets.”
31. See Edward Wolff, “Productivity, Computerization, and Skill 
Change,” Economic Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta, 
vol. 87, no. 3 (2002), pp. 63–87. There is evidence that it is more 
productive for businesses to combine high organizational capital 
with high IT capital than it is to invest in large amounts of one or 
the other. See Timothy Bresnahan, Erik Brynjolfsson, and Lorin 
Hitt, “Information Technology, Workplace Organization, and the 
Demand for Skilled Labor: Firm-Level Evidence,” Quarterly Jour-
nal of Economics, vol. 117, no. 1 (2002), pp. 339–376.
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idiosyncratic origins.33 He also argues that competitive 
pressure, which has increased steadily since the 1970s 
because of deregulation and globalization, appears to 
have been the catalyst. 
Other suggestive evidence comes from a study of individ-
ual retail establishments. Lucia Foster and her coauthors 
concluded that virtually all productivity growth in retail 
arises through entry and exit, and there is essentially no 
role for productivity growth among continuing establish-
ments.34 Specifically, they reported that almost all pro-
ductivity growth in the U.S. retail trade sector between 
1987 and 1997 came in the entry of establishments with 
higher-than-average productivity effectively displacing 
exiting establishments with lower-than-average produc-
tivity. Their results suggest that IT investments—at least 
those made by continuing plants—were not the source of 
productivity growth in that sector of the economy. 
The argument that competition spurs productivity 
growth appears compelling. And it also seems clear that 
the degree of competitive pressure has increased since the 
1970s, when the U.S. economy was subject to more regu-
lation and exposed to less competition from abroad. One 
problem with the competition argument is that it does 
not explain the abrupt rise in TFP growth after 2001. 
The decrease in regulation and the increase in globaliza-
tion were gradual and would suggest a gentler increase in 
productivity growth than actually occurred.
Explaining the Lag in European 
Productivity Growth
Many European countries have productivity levels that 
are equal to or exceed that of the United States, and they 
have invested heavily in IT, but they have not shared in 
the productivity gains those investments produced in the 
United States. The divergence between productivity 
growth in the United States and in Europe since 1995 is 
difficult to explain—both economies had access to the 
same technology. Indeed, it seems that the difference in 
performance does not stem from the productivity perfor-
mance of the IT-producing sectors. Raffaella Sadun and 
John Van Reenen report that the acceleration in Europe 
among IT-producing industries matched that in the 
United States.35 Instead, the difference comes from IT-
using industries—while productivity growth in those 
industries has surged ahead in the United States, it 
appears to have slowed in most of Europe.
No single explanation has emerged for the difference in 
European and U.S. productivity growth. Most hypothe-
ses, however, focus on differences in economic policies 
and institutions. U.S. labor markets tend to be more flex-
ible than are those in Europe, a condition that presum-
ably allows U.S. companies to reorganize work practices, 
to retrain (or transfer) workers, or to expand or contract 
as the market dictates. Some analysts argue that labor 
market rigidities prevent many countries in Europe from 
taking full advantage of IT investments because they 
inhibit the changes that are necessary to build intangible 
capital.36
Because product markets also are less regulated in the 
United States, competition is greater and there are fewer 
barriers to entry for new firms. Restrictions on land use 
in many European nations also limit the size of U.S.-style 
“big-box” retail stores, thus inhibiting competition, the 
development of efficient supply chains, and economies of 
scale.37 
32. See Jose Galdon-Sanchez and James Schmitz, “Competitive 
Pressure and Labor Productivity: World Iron-Ore Markets in the 
1980s,” American Economic Review, vol. 92, no. 4 (2002), 
pp. 1222–1235. A similar effect has been shown for the concrete 
industry in the United States. See Chad Syverson, Market Struc-
ture and Productivity: A Concrete Example, Working Paper 10501 
(Cambridge, Mass.: National Bureau of Economic Research, 
May 2004).
33. See Martin Baily, “Recent Productivity Growth: The Role of 
Information Technology and Other Innovations” Economic 
Review, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco (December 2004), 
pp. 35–41. 
34. See Lucia Foster, John Haltiwanger, and C.J. Krizan, The Link 
Between Aggregate and Micro Productivity Growth: Evidence from 
Retail Trade, Working Paper 9120 (Cambridge, Mass.: National 
Bureau of Economic Research, August 2002).
35. See Raffaella Sadun and John Van Reenen, Information Technology 
and Productivity: It Ain’t What You Do It’s the Way You Do I.T. 
Discussion Paper 2 (London: London School of Economics and 
Political Science, EDS Innovation Research Programme, October 
2005).
36. See Christopher Gust and Jaime Marquez, International Compari-
sons of Productivity Growth: The Role of Information Technology and 
Regulatory Practices, International Finance Discussion Paper 727 
(Washington, D.C.: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve 
System, May 2002).
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However, competition appears to influence productivity 
growth in other industries as well. For example, after 
reviewing a sample of industrialized nations, analysts at 
the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Devel-
opment reported that countries with more restrictive 
product market regulations had slower rates of producti-
vity growth over the 1978–2003 period than did those 
with more lenient rules.38 The authors focus on two 
channels to explain the inverse correlation. First, coun-
tries with more restrictive regulation of product markets 
generally had lower investments in IT, presumably 
because firms in those countries had less incentive to 
upgrade their capital stock with the latest technology. 
Second, countries with greater regulation had less foreign 
direct investment, which generally is thought to spur pro-
ductivity growth because it introduces new foreign tech-
nology into the domestic economy and because it 
increases the number of competitors in domestic product 
markets.
Management practices also have been credited with the 
divergence in productivity. Companies that rely on strict 
centralized decision making generally are less productive 
and less able to exploit investments in IT capital than are 
their more decentralized counterparts.39 According to 
this view, one reason for the divergence is that U.S. com-
panies mostly favor decentralized management structures. 
There also is evidence that multinational firms are more 
productive than are purely domestic firms and that U.S. 
multinationals are more productive than are those based 
in other countries.40 That condition does not appear to 
arise from differences in the quantity or quality either of 
capital or of labor. Instead, it appears that U.S. multi-
nationals have better management practices than do their 
counterparts in Europe.
CBO’s Projections
CBO’s projection for potential GDP reflects the con-
sensus that faster productivity growth after 1995 arose 
from developments in information technology, including 
technology advances and the boom in IT investment. 
CBO projects total factor productivity, an important 
input in the GDP estimate, by extrapolating the trend in 
TFP estimated from recent history. A key question is 
whether the rapid growth in TFP that has occurred since 
2001 indicates a change in the trend rate of growth. That 
is, should a forecast of TFP continue the 2.0 percent rate 
of growth since 2001? Should TFP instead be projected 
to grow at its pre-2001 rate? Or does the recent slowing 
in TFP growth suggest that the acceleration will reverse 
itself completely, with a period of below-trend growth 
that brings the series back to its pre-2001 trend line? The 
answers have important implications for the projection of 
real GDP.
In CBO’s judgment, the burst of IT innovation com-
bined with the boom in IT investment during the late 
1990s and early 2000s permanently increased the level, 
but not the growth rate, of productivity in the nation’s 
economy. Although the faster pace of productivity 
growth is unlikely to persist indefinitely, it also seems 
unlikely that the gains of the past decade will be undone. 
Consequently, CBO projects that TFP will follow a mid-
dle path—the recent surge in TFP growth will not con-
tinue at the same rate, but neither will the surge be 
reversed. Instead, TFP is projected to grow at a rate that 
is close to its pre-2001 trend rate. 
37. See Robert Gordon, Five Puzzles in the Behavior of Productivity, 
Investment, and Innovation (2004). In a more recent paper, Gor-
don has tempered this interpretation somewhat in recognition 
that the European slowdown has affected industries across the 
board. See Robert Gordon and Ian Dew-Becker, “Why Did 
Europe’s Productivity Catch-Up Sputter Out? A Tale of Tigers 
and Tortoises” (paper prepared for the Federal Reserve Bank of 
San Francisco Center for the Study of Innovation and Productiv-
ity Conference, “Productivity Growth: Causes and Conse-
quences,” San Francisco, November 18, 2005).
38. See Paul Conway and others, Regulation, Competition and Pro-
ductivity Convergence, OECD Economics Department Working 
Paper 509 (Paris, France: Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development, September 2006).
39. See Bresnahan, Brynjolfsson, and Hitt, “Information Technology, 
Workplace Organization, and the Demand for Skilled Labor.”
40. See Nick Bloom, Raffaella Sadun, and John Van Reenen, “It Ain’t 
What You Do It’s the Way That You Do I.T.—Testing Explana-
tions of Productivity Growth Using U.S. Affiliates” (working 
paper, Centre for Economic Performance, London School of Eco-
nomics, September 2005).
